An Examination of the Adequacy of the Laws Related to Cyber Warfare

An Examination of the Adequacy of the Laws Related to Cyber Warfare

This paper argues that the current rules of war are adequate for addressing the unique issues that are encountered as a result of conducting and defending against cyber warfare. The author begins by giving a survey of the laws that have the biggest impact on cyber warfare. Next, the author describes several paradigms that have come about as a result of cyber warfare, followed by a direct rebuttal. The author then asserts five reasons for why the U.S. should not enter into an international treaty for cyber warfare: (1) combatant commanders already have proper guidelines for conducting warfare; even in the information age; (2) fields of law are seldom demarcated by technology; (3) an unintended consequence of a cyber warfare law is that it may pose an undue limitation on a primarily non-lethal strategic deterrence; (4) our adversaries are unlikely to comply; and (5) the rate of technology growth will outpace the ability for an international cyber regime to produce responsive policy, while the flexibility allotted by the UN Charter and laws of war are able to absorb technological advances. The author concludes that the current UN Charter and Laws of War should continue to govern cyber warfare and that creating an international treaty or law for cyber warfare would do more harm than good and seriously cripple our ability to conduct war.

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