Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum makes the interception of transmitted information difficult. So difficult, in fact, that it has been mistaken as an encryption scheme by those who feel that FHSS cannot be easily defeated. Some commercial vendors that utilize FHSS claim it is superior to encryption technologies because "[i]t is common for new encryption schemes to be hacked within months of implementation." [1] They make these claims even after the fact that attacks against Bluetooth and 802.11-based FHSS have already fell victim to public proof-of-concept-based exploitation.
Our team will demonstrate the use of low-cost (and in some cases pretty, pink), easily obtained hardware/software to conduct predictive channel hopping analysis coupled with crude spectrum analysis and ultimately identify any given hopping pattern in the 902-928MHz spectrum. Our tools will attempt to identify the hopping pattern of a given FHSS cell within 24-48 hours given sufficient traffic. Upon conclusion this project will demonstrate that 900MHz-based FHSS attacks exist and will eventually affect the confidentiality and integrity of data transferred in the clear across what many organizations consider a "secure-as-is" solution.