Xeno, Corey, and John are Trusted Computing researchers at The MITRE Corporation. They focus on deep system security at the kernel level and below, and they have all also contributed material about these topics to OpenSecurityTraining.info.

Corey Kallenberg is a security researcher with an interest in operating system and PC firmware security. In 2012 he coauthored work on using timing based attestation to detect Windows kernel hooks at DEFCON and IEEE S&P. In 2013 his focus shifted to the BIOS, where he coauthored work pointing out problems in current PC trusted computing approaches. During this time frame he was also involved in discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities that allowed bypassing of the signed BIOS enforcement on a number of systems. These results were presented at NoSuchCon, Blackhat USA, EkoParty, HITB, ACM CCS, and other conferences. Corey is also the author of OpenTPM, the open source Trusted Platform Module (TPM) driver for Windows. Corey is currently continuing to investigate BIOS/UEFI and trusted computing implementations for security vulnerabilities.

Corey Kallenberg is a security researcher with an interest in operating system and PC firmware security. In 2012 he coauthored work on using timing based attestation to detect Windows kernel hooks at DEFCON and IEEE S&P. In 2013 his focus shifted to the BIOS, where he coauthored work pointing out problems in current PC trusted computing approaches. During this time frame he was also involved in discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities that allowed bypassing of the signed BIOS enforcement on a number of systems. These results were presented at NoSuchCon, Blackhat USA, EkoParty, HITB, ACM CCS, and other conferences. Corey is also the author of OpenTPM, the open source Trusted Platform Module (TPM) driver for Windows. Corey is currently continuing to investigate BIOS/UEFI and trusted computing implementations for security vulnerabilities.